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The limitations of inertial frame spacetime
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Abstract
For Knox, ‘spacetime’ is to be defined functionally, as that which
picks out a structure of local inertial frames. Assuming that Knox
is motivated to construct this functional definition of spacetime on
the grounds that it appears to identify that structure which plays
the operational role of spacetime—i.e., that structure which is actu-
ally surveyed by physical rods and clocks built from matter fields—we
identify in this paper important limitations of her approach: these
limitations are based upon the fact that there is a gap between in-
ertial frame structure and that which is operationally significant in
the above sense. We present five concrete cases in which these two
notions come apart, before considering various ways in which Knox’s
spacetime functionalism might be amended in light of these issues.
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1 Introduction
The attempt to lift all of geometry out of the murky sphere
of the empirical now led imperceptibly to a mental reori-
entation that is somewhat analogous to the promotion of
revered heroes of antiquity to gods. — Albert Einstein [20,
pp. 16-17]
The view that spacetime just is a Lorentizan manifold 〈M, gab〉
is no longer in vogue. Rather, in recent times philosophers have es-
poused a more nuanced approach to spacetime—Lam and Wu¨thrich
put the idea succinctly, when they state that “spacetime is as space-
time does” [32]. The idea is not to primitively identify some object
in the mathematics of one’s theories as being spatiotemporal, but
rather to identify the structures in one’s theories which play a certain,
antecedently-specified functional role of spacetime. This approach to
spacetime is now known as spacetime functionalism.
One of the best-known functional approaches to spacetime is due
to Eleanor Knox, who states the following: [31, p. 9]
I propose that the spacetime role is played by whatever
defines a structure of local inertial frames.
Call this approach inertial frame spacetime functionalism. Knox mo-
tivates her brand of functionalism by appeal to Harvey Brown’s views
on the operational significance of putatively spatiotemporal structures
in our theories of physics (see [31]). In particular (as we read her),
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she takes it that spacetime just is that structure which is surveyed
by physical rods and clocks, built from matter fields. That such a
reading is reasonable is evident in passages such as the following (and
her ensuing endorsement of the content thereof):
Much of Brown’s work is directly relevant to the question of
defining a role for spacetime structure. In particular, two
key themes emerge from his book [Physical Relativity [10]]
that can serve as desiderata when seeking a concise way of
expressing the spacetime role. First, Brown is concerned
with the operational significance of the spacetime metric;
the spacetime role had better ensure that the behaviour
of rods, clocks, light rays and test particles appropriately
(if not exactly) reflects the metric structure. Second, and
related, he notes that ensuring such operational significance
is a matter of dynamics. [31, p. 5]
As we will discuss in more detail below, the implicit motivation for
inertial frame spacetime functionalism is that it identifies structure
which satisfies these criteria.
It is, however, on exactly this front that in the present paper we
identify Knox’s programme as lacking. We do so by demonstrating
that the structure which “defines a structure of local inertial frames”—
what we dub theoretical spacetime—need not coincide with that struc-
ture which is actually surveyed by physical rods and clocks built from
matter fields—what we dub operational spacetime. In addition, in
this paper we seek to clarify other matters—for example, the connec-
tions between Knox’s inertial frame spacetime functionalism, and the
dynamical approach to spacetime theories, developed by Brown and
Pooley [10, 11, 12].
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In §2, we present Knox’s
inertial frame spacetime functionalism. In §3, we draw the above-
mentioned distinction between theoretical and operational spacetime.
In §4, we present five cases in which theoretical spacetime comes apart
from operational spacetime—while it turns out that Knox has the re-
sources to argue that one of these five cases is unproblematic, the
remaining four do seem to pose genuine problems for Knox’s account
(on the above reading). In §5, we consider means via which Knox
might revise her spacetime functionalist approach, in order to over-
come the gap between theoretical and operational spacetime. In §6,
we compare Knox’s spacetime functionalist approach with a different
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spacetime functionalist view, due to Baker [2]. In §7, we consider how
inertial frame spacetime functionalism relates to the dynamical and
geometrical approaches to spacetime theories.
2 Spacetime functionalism
There is a range of motivations that one might have for embracing a
functionalist approach to spacetime.1 For example, one might be con-
cerned with the semantic project of giving a systematic account of the
usage of the term ‘spacetime’. Alternatively, one might be interested
in identifying some significant universal properties of dynamical sys-
tems that allows one to abstract away from particular intrinsic features
of the systems under consideration (such as their microphysical com-
position), and to make generic claims about the behaviour of those
systems.2 It is this latter motivation which we impute to Knox—a
reading made plausible by passages such as the following:
[M]y argument here is more concerned with the identifica-
tion of empirical or phenomenological spacetime geometry,
that is the geometrical structure that is reflected by our
measuring instruments, operationalized coordinate systems
and the like. [29, p. 347]
For Knox, ‘spacetime’ should be associated with this codifying struc-
ture. The slogan of her own brand of spacetime functionalism—
inertial frame spacetime functionalism—is the following: “the space-
time role is played by whatever defines a structure of local inertial
1We ought to mention that the Knoxian functionalist project is distinct from the
Lewisian project of theoretical reduction, the latter also sometimes discussed under the
banner of ‘functionalism’ (see [36]). The Lewisian project regards the reduction of so-called
t-terms (‘troublesome’ terms that are not well understood in some domain of discourse)
to o-terms (‘old’ or antecedently sufficiently well-understood terms from a different do-
main of discourse). In the context of spacetime theories, Butterfield and Gomes [24] are
interested in the reduction of the troublesome notion of ‘time’ in, for example, general
relativity to non-temporal, dynamical structures defined on the theory’s phase space. Call
this a form of formal reductionism. The Knoxian project, on the other hand, is not a form
of formal reductionism. It is more akin to the Bridgmannian project of defining, opera-
tionally, a certain theoretically salient structure, using the same procedure across distinct
theories. Investigation of the extent to which these two projects’ aims diverge presents an
interesting avenue for future research.
2This way of putting things strengthens the connection (in our view still under-
explored) with functionalism in the philosophy of mind—cf. [35].
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frames” [31, p. 9]. The idea is to functionally define ‘spacetime’ as any
structure which itself picks out a structure of local inertial frames—
the thought being that, in turn, it is this structure which can play the
above-mentioned codifying role:
[C]onsidering the inertial structure provides a shortcut that
allows us to glean the empirical consequences of a theory
without going into the messy details of our various measur-
ing devices. [29, p. 347]
Now, of course, if Knox’s proposal is to have content, the meaning
of an ‘inertial frame’ must be articulated. Knox gives the following
(itself functional) characterisation of inertial frames:
In Newtonian theories, and in special relativity, inertial
frames have at least the following three features:
1. Inertial frames are frames with respect to which force
free bodies move with constant velocities.
2. The laws of physics take the same form (a particularly
simple one) in all inertial frames.
3. All bodies and physical laws pick out the same equiva-
lence class of inertial frames (universality). [29, p. 348]
Any structure which picks out a “structure of local inertial frames”,
i.e. a structure of local frames which satisfy these properties (initially
identified as significant in the Newtonian/special relativistic context)
qualifies, for Knox, as ‘spacetime’.
It is illustrative to consider what Knox has in mind here in the
particular, well-known case of general relativity. In order to do so, one
further piece of machinery needs to be introduced: the foundational
principle known as the strong equivalence principle (SEP). Here is how
Knox puts the SEP:3
To any required degree of approximation, given a suffi-
ciently small region of spacetime, it is possible to find a
reference frame with respect to whose associated coordi-
nates the metric field takes Minkowskian form, and the
connection and its derivatives do not appear in any of the
fundamental field equations of matter. [29, p. 352]
In general relativity, satisfaction of the SEP guarantees that the metric
field qualify as spatiotemporal, in Knox’s sense. The reason is that,
3Knox’s version of the SEP draws on that presented by Brown at [10, p. 169].
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locally, the symmetries of the dynamical metric field coincide with
those of the dynamical equations governing all of the matter fields;
in any frame in which these dynamical equations take their simplest
form, the metric field itself takes the form diag (−1, 1, 1, 1). (In this
paper, following e.g. [49, §3.1], we take dynamical symmetries to be
those transformations which leave invariant the form of the dynamical
equations in the theory under consideration, and we take metric sym-
metries to be transformations which leave invariant the metric field
under consideration.) Thus, the metric field picks out a structure of
local inertial frames for all of the matter fields, and so qualifies as spa-
tiotemporal.4 This verdict seems correct, insofar as one thinks that
it is the metric field gab of general relativity which codifies important
aspects of the dynamics—e.g., intervals of distance and proper time
as read off by physical rods and clocks built from matter fields.
At this point, however, one might ask the following question: how
is it that in general such inertial frame structure captures—without
recourse to the details—dynamical facts? It is clear that inertial frame
structure does capture the common symmetries of the dynamical equa-
tions governing matter fields. However, there certainly remains a con-
ceptual gap to be bridged between such symmetries, and the full dy-
namics of matter, in particular the behaviour of physical systems built
from matter fields. In this paper, we argue that the prima facie suc-
cess of Knox’s programme is a consequence of contingent facts about
the relationship between symmetries and full dynamics. When this
relationship breaks down, we discover that Knox’s prescription falters
in its attempt to pick out an operationally significant structure.5
4There are significant complications here regarding whether the SEP should be under-
stood to hold at a point in the manifold of general relativity, or to hold in the neighbour-
hood of a point. Moreover, there are subtleties regarding approximations which must be
assumed in order to deliver such local coincidence of symmetries. For detailed discussion
of these issues, see [55]; we set them aside in this paper. It should also be mentioned that
we are in full agreement with Lehmkuhl when he describes the SEP as a “bridge principle”
between general relativity and special relativity—see [34, §4].
5It is worth drawing attention en passant to another tension in Knox’s approach. In
canonical applications of her inertial frame spacetime functionalism (such as to Newtonian
gravity—see [30]), Knox applies the programme to theories in which the notion of oper-
ational content is problematic from the outset. In particular, because Newtonian gravity
lacks stable bulk matter, the notion of a physical rod or clock in that theory is not just
idealised, but requires denying the truth (or at least the completeness) of the theory’s
laws in order to be taken seriously. Many thanks to an anonymous referee for this astute
observation.
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3 Theoretical and operational space-
time
In this section, we argue that Knox’s prescription correctly identifies a
structure which we refer to as theoretical spacetime. But the promise
of determining an operationally significant structure—i.e., one which
is surveyed by physical measurement apparatuses such as rods and
clocks—is achieved only via the identification of a (possibly) different
structure—one which we refer to as operational spacetime. Knox’s
prescription does not invariably deliver operational spacetime.
We begin, in §3.1, by introducing the concept of theoretical space-
time. In §3.2, we discuss the distinct notion of operational spacetime.
This sets up the discussion in §4, in which we present five cases in
which theoretical spacetime comes apart from operational spacetime.
3.1 Theoretical spacetime
If (local) dynamical symmetries coincide with (local) symmetries of
a given metric field,6 then we say that that metric field qualifies as
theoretical spacetime. However, within this notion of theoretical space-
time, a more fine-grained distinction is possible:
1. Symmetry-coincident theoretical spacetime: That geometrical struc-
ture the (local) symmetries of which coincide with the (local)
symmetries of the dynamical equations governing matter fields,
up to the invariant quantities associated with these transforma-
tions.
2. Cone-coincident theoretical spacetime: That geometrical struc-
ture the (local) symmetries of which coincide with the (local)
symmetries of the dynamical equations governing matter fields,
and which (where applicable) agrees on the invariant quantities
associated with those dynamical symmetries.7
6Or, more generally should we wish to accommodate Newtonian theories, a given piece
of geometrical structure—not necessarily a metric field.
7For dialectical reasons, our focus in this paper is on the lightcone structure in the
tangent spaces of the manifold. This does not mean that we are claiming that conformal
structure on its own determines spacetime structure. Implicit in our discussion is the
moral from Weyl [60, 61] and Ehlers, Pirani and Schild [18], that conformal and projective
structure together determine (up to an overall volume factor) the metric structure of
7
Figure 1: Lightcone structures associated with two different Lorentzian metrics,
for which the invariant speeds do not coincide.
In the case of symmetry-coincident theoretical spacetime, although
the symmetries of the geometrical structure under consideration coin-
cide (modulo a choice of parameter value of the invariant quantity, call
it c8) with the (antecedently-coincident) symmetries of the dynamical
equations governing matter fields, the associated inertial frames need
not coincide. Here is another way to put the issue. Consider two
Lorentzian metrics ηab and η˜ab, related by
η˜ab = ηab − ξaξb, (1)
for a particular, suitable choice of 1-form ξa. The addition of the
second term alters the shape of the cone structures associated with
ηab versus η˜ab—thus, the situation is as in figure 1, in which (say)
ηab is associated with the outer (blue) cones, and η˜ab with the inner
(red) cones. In turn, one can demonstrate that the isometries of ηab
correspond to Lorentz transformations with one particular invariant
speed, and the isometries of η˜ab correspond to Lorentz transformations
with a different invariant speed. It follows that the frames in which
ηab takes its diagonal form are different to the frames in which η˜ab
spacetime. When we speak of cone-coincidence, we therefore also assume coincidence of
projective structure.
8This constant is, of course, the one-way speed of light. Nothing that we say in this
paper turns on the choice of synchrony convention used to arrive at this constant. However,
for dialectical clarity, we assume spatial isotropy, and therefore the Einstein-Poincare´
synchrony convention.
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takes its diagonal form—the former are related by the first class of
Lorentz transformations, the latter by the second.9
Now consider a situation in which the fundamental metric field in
one’s theory is ηab, but the metric field to which the matter fields are
coupled in their dynamical equations is η˜ab. In such a case, ηab would
qualify as symmetry-coincident theoretical spacetime (for both it and
the dynamical equations governing matter fields have Lorentz trans-
formations with distinct invariant speed parameters as their symme-
tries), but not cone-coincident theoretical spacetime (for the specific
Lorentz transformations which are symmetries of these objects are
different—they feature different invariant speeds).
3.2 Operational spacetime
Cone-coincidence is a stronger condition than symmetry-coincidence.
Anticipating, however, that cone-coincidence between a given geomet-
rical structure (viz., a Lorentzian metric field) and the metric field
codifying the symmetries of the dynamical equations governing matter
fields might nevertheless not be sufficient for that geometrical struc-
ture to be surveyed by physical measuring apparatuses built from mat-
ter fields, we introduce at this juncture a third species of spacetime,
which we dub operational spacetime:
3. Operational spacetime: That geometrical structure which is cor-
rectly surveyed by appropriate configurations of all dynamical
fields.
Appropriate configurations of dynamical fields (in particular, rods
and clocks—i.e., measurement devices with putative sensitivity to
metric and affine structure) ‘correctly survey’ a metric just in case
they (approximately) correctly read off intervals of distance, or of
proper time along their worldlines, as given by that metric field.
As we read her, Knox’s motivation in advancing her inertial frame
spacetime functionalism is to provide a shortcut to identifying op-
9In other words, the outer (blue) cone is one for which our coordinates are normalised,
and c = 1; which makes the invariant speed corresponding to the inner (red) cone, c′ < 1.
The first set of matter fields will be Lorentz invariant under Lorentz transformations where
the parameter is c (i.e. the γ parameter is of the form γ = 1√
1− v2
c2
); the second set will be
invariant under Lorentz transformations where the parameter is c′ (i.e. the γ parameter
is of the form γ = 1√
1− v2
c′2
).
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erational spacetime by identifying cone-coincident theoretical space-
time. When the metric structure is non-dynamical, and even in a large
class of dynamical metric models, theoretical spacetime is indeed the
same as operational spacetime, assuming stable matter configurations
can be built. In the next section, however, we discuss five cases in
which, even assuming that stable matter configurations exist, theoret-
ical spacetime does not coincide with operational spacetime.
4 Theoretical/operational mismatches
In this section, we present five apparent problem cases for Knox’s in-
ertial frame spacetime functionalism, in which theoretical spacetime
comes apart from operational spacetime. We will see that, while in-
structive, the first example is not genuinely problematic for Knox. By
contrast, we take it that the subsequent four examples are genuine
problem cases.
4.1 TeVeS
Our first example concerns Bekenstein’s bimetric TeVeS (‘Tensor-
Vector-Scalar’) theory—a relativistic generalisation of the ‘modified
Newtonian dynamics’ (MOND) programme in cosmology [42]—as pre-
sented in [5, 6]. As discussed in [10, §9.5.2], in this theory the metric
field which is surveyed by rods and clocks, the conformal structure of
which is traced by light rays, and the geodesics of which correspond to
the motion of free bodies, is not the ‘fundamental’ metric field gab, but
rather a less ‘fundamental’ metric field g˜ab, constructed from the other
matter fields in the theory [10, p. 174]. In this case, both gab and g˜ab
are Lorentzian metric fields; moreover, the matter fields in this the-
ory obey (in the relevant regime) locally Poincare´ invariant dynamical
laws. Thus, one might think that, on Knox’s inertial frame spacetime
functionalism, both gab and g˜ab have local (Poincare´) symmetries co-
inciding with the local symmetries of the dynamical laws governing
matter fields, so that both fields would qualify as spatiotemporal—an
apparent problem.
To claim as much would be too fast—a defence of inertial frame
spacetime functionalism can be mustered by drawing on the distinc-
tion between symmetry-coincident theoretical spacetime, and cone-
coincident theoretical spacetime. In TeVeS, it is the metric field g˜ab,
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and not the metric field gab, which takes a diagonal form in the frames
in which the dynamical equations governing matter fields take their
simplest form (cf. [55, §6]). Thus, while gab qualifies as symmetry-
coincident theoretical spacetime, it does not qualify as cone-coincident
theoretical spacetime. If one takes “picking out a structure of local
inertial frames” to require cone coincidence, then there is room for a
Knoxian spacetime functionalist to make the claim that, in TeVeS,
the metric field gab is not spatiotemporal—rather, only g˜ab is spa-
tiotemporal. For Knox, this is the correct verdict, since it is g˜ab which
is to be regarded as operationally significant, in TeVeS. Thus, this
example should not be taken to be a genuine problem case for Knox.
4.2 Universally coupled massive scalar gravity
Pitts presents in [48] a family of examples in order to support the
claim that (putting things in our language) a given piece of geomet-
rical structure may qualify as theoretical spacetime, but not opera-
tional spacetime. In this section, we consider Pitts’ example of univer-
sally coupled massive scalar gravity—a variant of Nordstro¨m’s mass-
less scalar gravity theory [44, 56], discussed in more detail by Pitts
himself in [45, 46, 47], which is one of the principal examples which
Pitts introduces in order to motivate the above claim.
In universally coupled massive scalar gravity, there exist two Loren-
tizan metric fields: the field surveyed by matter gab, and a Minkowski
metric field ηab; the Lagrangian includes the following graviton mass
piece:
Lmass = m
2
64piG
[ √−g
w − 1 +
√−gw√−η1−w
w (1− w) −
√−η
w
]
. (2)
(Here, w is a free parameter, which may be fixed to yield specific
theories.) In these theories, all matter couples to the same metric, gab.
However, the Minkowski metric ηab nevertheless plays an ineliminable
role in defining the massive graviton Lagrangian. From our point of
view, the important point to note about such theories is put clearly
by Pitts as follows:
Massive scalar gravity lacks Minkowskian behavior of rods
and clocks, though it has the Minkowski metric (among
other things) and the Poincare´ symmetry group. ... [T]he
chronometrically observable conformally flat metric gµν =
ηˆµν(−g)1/4 isn’t clearly the One True Geometry. [48, p. 6]
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That such theories present a prima facie problem for Knox’s space-
time functionalism (as we understand it) should be clear, for in such
theories it would appear that the metric field ηab picks out the symme-
tries of the dynamical equations governing matter fields. One might,
however, question whether this example is genuinely problematic for
Knox, by (as in the TeVeS case) denying that metric field ηab in such
theories qualifies as not just symmetry-coincident theoretical space-
time, but also cone-coincident theoretical spacetime. Since Knox de-
clares that only the latter is spacetime tout court, it is only if she
identifies ηab as cone-coincident theoretical spacetime that she faces a
problem here.
Such a response will not work in this case.10 Since the metric field
ηab is conformally related to the ‘chronometrically observable’ metric
field gab, the two diagonalise in the same frames—the volume ele-
ment is just a proportionality factor between the two metrics at each
point. Thus, ηab does qualify as cone-coincident theoretical spacetime
in this case (unlike g˜ab in TeVeS)—in spite of not being operational
spacetime. So Knox’s inertial frame spacetime functionalism misiden-
tifies ηab as being spatiotemporal in universally coupled massive scalar
gravity—worse, the account identifies both ηab and gab as being spa-
tiotemporal, despite their having observably different consequences on
large-scale measurements.11
4.3 T-duality
An ubiquitous feature of a prominent class of quantum theories of
gravity—that is, theories which seek to reconcile classical general rel-
ativity with quantum mechanics—is duality. For the purposes of this
paper, we can take a duality to be an isomorphism of the spaces of
solutions of two theories (up to equivalence classes of gauge-related
solutions), such that solutions related by that mapping are empiri-
cally equivalent (in turn, the empirical equivalence of two models can
be cashed out in terms of their agreeing on all empirical substruc-
tures, in the sense of van Fraassen [59, pp. 67ff.]). In this sense,
dualities present prima facie a concrete case of underdetermination
of theory by evidence, for they exemplify our having to hand two dif-
ferent theories—which make prima facie distinct ontological claims
10Thanks to Brian Pitts for discussion on this point.
11Of course, Knox could just accept multiple realisability here—our thanks to Jeremy
Butterfield for pointing this out.
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about the world—which are nonetheless empirically equivalent. (For
more on dualities and underdetermination, see [38, 52, 33]).
Our concern in the present subsection is with T-duality—one par-
ticular duality, which appears in perturbative string theory. Accord-
ing to the na¨ıve ontological picture presented by perturbative string
theory, reality is constituted by one-dimensional strings in some back-
ground ‘target space’, as well as by other higher-dimensional entities
called ‘branes’. Moreover, reality is not made up of four spacetime di-
mensions (three spatial and one temporal), but rather of ten. Various
classical fields are defined on target space—ultimately, these are also
understood to be composed of strings; for consistency reasons, these
background fields must obey the Einstein equation, plus higher-order
corrections (for philosophical discussion of this, see e.g. [26, 51, 53]).
In the case of T-duality, models of perturbative string theory on a
target space product manifold M×S1 with radius of the compactified
dimension R are found to be dual to models of perturbative string
theory on the target space product manifold M × S1 with radius of
the compactified dimension proportional to 1/R (see e.g. [4, ch. 6]).
To be more specific, in the case of T-duality, one of the T-dual mod-
els readsM = 〈M×S1, gab,Φ〉; the other reads M˜ = 〈M×S1, g˜ab, Φ˜〉.
WhileM (say) has target space metric field gab of ‘large’ radius (pro-
portional to R), M˜ has target space metric field g˜ab of ‘small’ radius
(proportional to 1/R). In both M and M˜, the Lorentzian metric
field in those models satisfies the Einstein equation (plus higher-order
corrections), and the matter fields satisfy their own dynamical equa-
tions.12 What can one say about the nature of spacetime in each of
these models? (For more discussion on these matters, see [53].) InM,
the metric field gab is Lorenzian, and satisfies the Einstein equation;
moreover, the dynamical equations governing the behaviour of the Φ
fields are locally Poincare´ invariant. Similarly for g˜ab and Φ˜ in M˜.
Thus, on a Knoxian analysis, gab picks out a structure of local inertial
frames in M, and g˜ab picks out a structure of local inertial frames
in M˜. Note, indeed, that gab qualifies as cone-coincident theoreti-
cal spacetime in M, and g˜ab qualifies as cone-coincident theoretical
spacetime in M˜.
So far, so good. But should gab qualify as operational space-
time in M, and should g˜ab qualify as operational spacetime in M˜?
12Unlike e.g. the case of general relativity, however, in perturbative string theory there
is no freedom to choose the dynamical equations governing matter fields independently of
the Einstein equation—see [53].
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Some recent considerations due to Huggett [25], in turn drawing upon
the work of Brandenberger and Vafa [8], might lead one to question
this.13 Brandenberger and Vafa ask us to consider the following situ-
ation: imagine ourselves to be an observer ‘embedded’ in one of these
T-dual models. Then, consider firing a test photon in order to measure
the radius of the compactified dimension, in both M and M˜. Bran-
denberger and Vafa argue that, in both M and M˜, it is the metric
field of larger compactified dimension that will be measured—that is,
in both cases, it will be gab that is measured.
14 Huggett draws from
these considerations the following lesson: target space cannot (as we
might na¨ıvely expect) qualify as “phenomenal space”—the classical
spacetime than an agent ‘embedded’ in the model under considera-
tion would experience—for in M˜, intervals of the target space metric
field g˜ab are not read off by our measurement apparatuses (rather,
the thought experiment of Brandenberger and Vafa indicates that it
is the target space metric field gab which is surveyed in this case). To
put the matter in our own terminology: while the target space metric
field in T-dual models of perturbative string theory might qualify as
theoretical spacetime (even cone-coincident theoretical spacetime), for
its symmetries coincide with the symmetries of the dynamical equa-
tions governing matter fields (that is, the Poincare´ symmetries of the
dynamical equations governing the matter fields Φ inM coincide with
the Poincare´ symmetries of the metric field gab inM, so that gab qual-
ifies as theoretical spacetime in this case, and similarly for Φ˜ and g˜ab
in M˜), the target space metric field does not invariably qualify as
operational spacetime, for its intervals are not invariably read off by
physical measurement apparatuses (as is the case for g˜ab in M˜).
Given the above-mentioned operationalist tendencies which we find
in Knox,15 one might regard this as being problematic: Knox’s space-
13The remainder of this subsection proceeds on the assumption that the Huggett-
Brandenberger-Vafa analysis is correct.
14Presumably, the thought here is that one fires a photon around the compactified
dimension, then uses a clock to record the interval of time taken for the photon to return;
in the world associated with both M and M˜, this will be the interval of time associated
with the target space manifold of ‘large’ radius.
15To be clear: we take Knox to be an operationalist only with respect to the spacetime
concept: for Knox (as we read her), spacetime is essentially related to measurability via
physical measurement apparatuses, such as rods and clocks. We do not attribute to
Knox the stronger thesis of Bridgmanian operationalism, according to which “we mean by
any concept nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is synonymous with the
corresponding set of operations” [9, p. 5]. (For an illuminating recent survey of this form of
14
time functionalist account appears to identify objects in perturbative
string theory which qualify as theoretical spacetime, but which do
not qualify as operational spacetime. And thus, again, it seems that
Knox’s account does not afford her all that she is after.
4.4 Specific general relativity solutions
Although a valuable tool in the quest to identify spatiotemporal de-
grees of freedom in theories of quantum gravity, Knox’s spacetime
functionalism was developed initially with the goal of ascertaining
the structure which plays the spacetime role in established physical
theories, such as Newtonian gravitation theory and general relativity.
It is, therefore, especially interesting to discover a failure of Knox’s
programme within the context of general relativity itself. In this sub-
section, we demonstrate that a class of rotating general relativistic
spacetimes presents a problem for Knox’s programme—one in which
her criteria for cone-coincident theoretical spacetime are met, but in
which the metric field nonetheless does not have operational signifi-
cance. (So, in this case, the metric field qualifies as cone-coincident
theoretical spacetime, but not operational spacetime.)16
In order for the metric field to have operational significance, it
must be possible for certain matter field agglomerations—clocks—to
be able to read off intervals of proper time (as given by that metric
field) along their trajectories. The degree of operational significance
depends, among other things, on the degree to which these matter field
agglomerations can maintain their structural integrity. A matter field
agglomeration satisfies the clock hypothesis if it can be used to read
off intervals of proper time along its worldline—whatever that world-
line may be (see e.g. [13, 39] for some recent philosophical discussion
of the clock hypothesis). Clearly this is an unphysical requirement;
all physical clocks have a breaking point. But modulo such concerns,
approximate satisfaction of the clock hypothesis suffices for approxi-
mate operational significance of the metric field under consideration,
in terms of clock readings.
Light clocks—simple constructions consisting of two perfectly re-
operationalism, see [17].) We do, however, agree that it would be useful for Knox to clarify
why her operationalism is more defensible in the spacetime context than in general—our
thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this concern.
16The results upon which this section are based were first presented in the physics
literature in [1]; see [41] for discussion of some of the philosophical implications.
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flecting mirrors with a photon bouncing back-and-forth between them—
are often regarded as being ideal clocks, i.e. are regarded as being can-
didates for satisfaction of the clock hypothesis. Therefore, a scenario
in which such clocks can be constructed is usually taken to be one
in which the metric field has operational significance. Fletcher [21]
offers a mathematical precisification of this intuition, purporting to
demonstrate how it is, in principle, possible to construct a light clock
that ticks arbitrarily accurately and regularly in an arbitrary general
relativity solution. If correct, Fletcher’s argument would underwrite
the success of Knox’s programme in general relativity—for the met-
ric field, which Knox identifies as spatiotemporal, could always be
regarded as having operational significance, via the readings of light
clocks. However, as demonstrated explicitly in [41], Fletcher’s result
in not universally valid. It fails in the Go¨del and Kerr solutions to
general relativity, for example. As we demonstrate in the remainder of
this subsection, this failure is not down to a failure of cone-coincidence.
Fletcher’s proof represents a differential-geometric generalisation
of a heuristic argument for the clock hypothesis in Minkowski space-
time due to Maudlin [39, pp. 106-114]. Maudlin’s argument proceeds
as follows. The path traversed by a photon (more precisely, the clas-
sical analogue of a photon; a wave-packet state of the electromagnetic
field) between two mirrors is a null geodesic. This is easily demon-
strated by solving Maxwell’s equations. Consider a light clock at rest.
The proper time elapsed along the worldline of one mirror can be cal-
culated by using the generalisation of Pythagoras’ theorem to pseudo-
Riemannian flat space. Since the distance covered by a light ray is
zero (as it propagates on null geodesics), the proper time elapsed be-
tween two successive bounces of the photon off the same mirror is just
twice the spatial distance between the two mirrors.
A similar argument holds for a clock in a boosted frame. For an
ideal clock, the description of the clock in the boosted frame with
respect to the boosted coordinates is the same as the original descrip-
tion with respect to the original coordinates; this is just the relativity
principle. If the clock were to be a good clock, and one were to re-
gard the boosted clock from the original unboosted frame, the mirrors
would appear to have moved closer together. So we can ensure the
clock is good by joining the two mirrors using a rod built out of mat-
ter governed by Lorentz-covariant laws. The natural contraction of
the rod ensures the appropriate distance between the mirrors is main-
tained even after a boost. This takes care of the clock hypothesis
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for a boosted clock. Finally, to the extent that any boost can be
modelled as being approximated by inertial motions separated by in-
stantaneous impulses, the clock hypothesis is approximately satisfied
by a light clock so constructed in Minkowski spacetime. Fletcher’s
result is similar in spirit; although it does away with the rigid rod, it
just requires that the light clock be confined to an appropriately small
region of the manifold. Relying on particular features of Lorentzian
manifolds, Fletcher demonstrates that such a region always exists, and
with it, demonstrates that Maudlin’s result can be generalised.
Mathematically, all is well with the proof. However, like Maudlin,
Fletcher relies on the assumption that light traverses null geodesics
on its path between the mirrors. But this is not true in all solu-
tions to the Einstein equation. As Asenjo and Hojman demonstrate
[1], in solutions with global rotation such as Go¨del and Kerr (cf. [37,
ch. 3]), to the extent that one can have a persisting wave packet that
represents light, this packet does not traverse null geodesics; indeed
it does not even traverse a path of constant velocity, but instead its
velocity manifests spacetime position dependence.17 This means that
light clocks, if constructable, do not accurately read off intervals of the
general relativistic metric field. The metric field, therefore, cannot be
afforded operational significance via light clocks. Since light clocks are
one of the simplest kinds of clock which one could imagine, in such
spacetimes, the metric field does not, it appears, qualify as operational
spacetime—for if even light clocks do not read off intervals of proper
time along their worldlines, there is no a priori reason to expect this
to be true of more complicated clocks either.
To repeat: it is interesting to note that locally, the cone structure
of the metric field gab and that of the dynamical equations governing
the Maxwell fields do coincide. Thus, we have in these examples an
apparent case of cone-coincident theoretical spacetime, but not oper-
ational spacetime.
17We wish to register here a prima facie tension between the Asenjo-Hojman result, and
a recent, distinct result of Geroch and Weatherall [22], according to which ‘small bodies’
built from Maxwell fields ‘track’ null geodesics of the Levi-Civita connection. If it turns
out that the Geroch-Weatherall result is correct, and the Asenjo-Hojman result incorrect,
then this would render the examples presented in this subsection impotent. Our belief
here, however, is that the tension between these results is only apparent—for the Geroch-
Weatherall result assumes global hyperbolicity, which is violated in the spacetimes which
Asenjo and Hojman consider. To fully address the interplay between these two works is
likely to constitute a fascinating avenue for future pursuit.
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4.5 Supersymmetry and superspace
Our final example of a theoretical/operational spacetime mismatch de-
rives from a subject which goes beyond the Standard Model of particle
physics—namely, supersymmetry (SUSY). SUSY is a proposed (and
as-yet experimentally unverified) symmetry between bosons (quan-
tum particles which mediate forces) and fermions (quantum particles
which constitute matter which feels those forces). Supersymmetric
field theories are, therefore, field theories whose empirical predictions
are invariant under the exchange of bosons and their fermionic super-
symmetric partners, and vice versa. Note that SUSY transformations
are defined between specific bosons and fermions—no particle as-yet
discovered, bosonic or fermionic, is a supersymmetric partner of any
other known particle. If SUSY is a symmetry of nature, then the en-
ergy regime in which we live is one significantly below the symmetry-
breaking scale. In the rest of this section, we concern ourselves only
with the realm of unbroken SUSY.18
SUSY field theories make for an interesting testing ground for var-
ious philosophical claims related to spacetime, because they can be
expressed in a setting that is a generalisation of Minkowski space-
time, known as superspace.19 The simplest superspace is constructed
by augmenting Minkowski spacetime with four additional dimensions.
The twist is that, unlike the familiar spatial and temporal dimensions
of Minkowski spacetime, these dimensions are not coordinatised by
real numbers. Instead, in order to reflect the fermionic character of
some of the components of a superfield—the superspace generalisation
of a field, thought of as a function from superspace to some field-value
space—the four extra dimensions are coordinatised by objects known
as anticommuting supernumbers. A supernumber is, technically, an
element of an infinite Grassmann algebra. Intuitively, an anticom-
muting supernumber is an object χ such that if χ and ξ are two
anticommuting supernumbers, then χ · ξ + ξ · χ = 0. In other words,
the order of multiplication matters—these numbers have non-trivial
commutation properties. The set of complex supernumbers consists of
all such anticommuting supernumbers, together with all commuting
18For a recent, philosophically-oriented introduction to SUSY, see [40]; for a different
philosophical take, see [3].
19Note that this use of ‘superspace’, to refer to the spacetime setting of a SUSY field
theory, is distinct from the homonymous term used in the context of canonical geometro-
dynamics (see e.g. [23] for a review) to refer to a space of spatial 3-metrics.
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supernumbers (objects constructed out of anticommuting supernum-
bers such that the order of multiplication is irrelevant) and all the
complex numbers.
The set of dynamical symmetry transformations common to all
superfields is, by construction, the super-Poincare´ group—this is an
example of a ‘super-Lie group’. Super-Lie groups are a generalisation
of Lie groups; whereas the latter are groups which are also smooth
manifolds, the former are groups which are also superspaces (i.e., gen-
eralisations of manifolds with anti-commuting supernumber-valued co-
ordinates). Recall that a theoretical spacetime is a geometrical struc-
ture determined by constructing geometrical objects that are invariant
under transformations from the dynamical symmetry group common
to all fields in question. By construction, therefore, superspace is a
theoretical spacetime.20
The Poincare´ group is a subgroup of the super-Poincare´ group,
a fortiori, any Poincare´ transformation is a dynamical symmetry of
a supersymmetric theory. We therefore have a symmetry-coincident
theoretical spacetime. If, in addition, we assume the light postulate,
or some equivalent statement of an invariant quantity for the tangent
spaces to the (ordinary) manifold subspace of superspace, we can con-
struct a cone-coincident theoretical spacetime. Cone-coincidence is
only a claim about tangent spaces to manifolds, so applies perfectly
sensibly to superspace insofar as superspace is an ordinary manifold
together with some other structure.
Knox’s prescription identifies as inertial those frames in which the
dynamical equations governing matter fields take their simplest form.
In the case under consideration here, these are those frames in which
the dynamical equations governing the superfields are expressed in co-
ordinates in which an object referred to (perhaps predictably) as the
super-Minkowski interval, determined by the super-Minkowski metric
(for an explicit definition of these terms, see e.g. [15]), is invariant.
Thus, the super-Minkowski metric plays the role of picking out ‘iner-
tial’ frames (these frames are sometimes referred to as ‘super-inertial
frames’; see e.g. [15])—it therefore qualifies as cone-coincident theo-
retical spacetime.
To see if the super-Minkowski metric qualifies as an operational
20Baker argues in [3] that Knox’s inertial frame spacetime functionalism cannot actually
establish the result that superspace is (in our terminology) theoretical spacetime, for
Knox’s account depends on a prior specification of frames of reference as either frames on
Minkowski spacetime or frames on superspace. In this paper, we set this issue aside.
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spacetime, however, we need to assume that one can construct the
appropriate generalisation of rods and clocks. Let us call these ob-
jects super-surveyors. An example of a super-surveyor would be the
analogue of a light clock, but one in which the oscillating material is
governed by the supersymmetric version of Maxwell’s equations, the
so-called super-Maxwell equations. But, as is discussed in more detail
in [40], there are good reasons to believe that the extra SUSY dimen-
sions will not be be surveyed by such matter field configurations.
To see why this is the case, let us begin with a familiar example: de-
riving the Lorentz transformations in special relativity. If one begins
with the relativity principle (and the assumption that spacetime is ho-
mogeneous and space is isotropic), then the Lorentz transformations
follow from the further assumption of the light postulate. This latter
postulate is an empirical principle that asserts two things: (1) that
the invariant quantity associated with the transformations between
inertial frames is a speed, and (2) that this speed has a particular
numerical value. In light of the discussion in §3.1, we can conclude
that a different value for this speed would lead to a different group
of transformations between inertial frames. Thus, the light postulate
and the relativity principle together determine the cone structure of
the tangent spaces.
The problem with attempting to generalise this move to superspace
is that, in that context, there exists no empirical principle analogous
to the light postulate. It is possible to define the tangent space at a
point in superspace, in effect by specifying algebraically the space of
tangent vectors along anticommuting dimensions—for details, see [15,
p. 406]. In postulating that the transformations between super-inertial
frames are super-Poincare´ transformations, and not saying anything
further, the parameter that determines the tangent space cone (i.e. the
null direction) for the anticommuting dimensions is left unspecified.
If we believe that our surveying devices have to be built out of
SUSY-matter (and that seems reasonable; how else could they survey
the superspace geometry?) then it is possible that this matter will not
read off intervals of the super-interval, even if, with respect to the
Minkowski subspace of superspace, we have cone coincidence. The
reason is the following: all our superfields are (by construction) super-
Poincare´ invariant—but they might, nonetheless, still survey distinct
supermetrics because they do not agree on the cone structure of the
anticommuting component of the tangent space to superspace.
Thus, super-surveyors constructed in this way will not be guar-
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anteed to give us operational access to spacetime; they might fail to
pick out operational spacetime even if they unequivocally pick out
(via the symmetries of their dynamical equations) a cone-coincident
theoretical spacetime.
5 Proposed revisions
We have seen that some apparent problem cases for inertial frame
spacetime functionalism—in particular, that presented in §4.1—do
not find their mark, for they fail to appreciate the distinction be-
tween symmetry-coincident and cone-coincident theoretical spacetime.
If one takes it that it is the latter notion of theoretical spacetime in
which Knox is interested when she proposes her functional characteri-
sation of spacetime in terms of picking out a structure of local inertial
frames, then Knox’s approach does deliver the intuitively correct ver-
dict on what counts as spatiotemporal in the TeVeS case. On the
other hand, other apparent problem cases for inertial frame space-
time functionalism—in particular, those presented in §§4.2-4.5—do
find their mark, for in these cases cone-coincident theoretical space-
time does not qualify as operational spacetime—which, for Knox, is
the intuitively correct notion of spatiotemporality.
These problem cases lead one to enquire how Knox’s spacetime
functionalist proposal could be modified in order to deliver the intu-
itively correct verdict on what counts as spatiotemporal in all cases.
The natural revision to propose is the following:
Spacetime is that structure which has chronometric signif-
icance.
Making this move would mean that the correct verdict on spa-
tiotemporality would be delivered in all the cases presented in §4.
However, arguably such a move would have the disadvantage that it
would deprive Knox’s characterisation of spacetime of easy applica-
bility to new cases.21 For example, consider the case of Go¨del/Kerr
spacetime presented in §4.4. When one considers Maxwell fields in
such a spacetime, it is easy to note that the metric field of general
relativity qualifies as cone-coincident theoretical spacetime—and so
21Though one can, of course, ask: “Why should it be easy to find the realiser of the
functional role in question?” Our thanks to Jeremy Butterfield and an anonymous reviewer
for this comment—with which we have some sympathies.
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spacetime for Knox tout court. However, it is very difficult—and in-
volves substantial, non-trivial calculations—to ascertain whether this
structure does or does not qualify as operational spacetime. Thus, to
define spacetime in terms of operational spacetime would, arguably, di-
minish the ready applicability of Knox’s programme.22 Indeed, Knox
says as much herself, when she writes:
We would ideally like a formulation that entails appropriate
phenomenological behaviour without requiring us to model
the behaviour of complex systems. [31, p. 5]
In light of this, one might instead wonder whether there is any
way in which Knox’s original proposal could be defended. Ideally,
what Knox would need to argue here is that (cone-coincident) the-
oretical spacetime is in general a good—albeit defeasible, in light of
the cases presented in §4—guide to operational spacetime. If such a
link can be rendered explicit, then there is room for Knox to retain
her original functional definition of spacetime, in terms of picking out
a structure of local inertial frames. What the examples presented in
§4 of this chapter demonstrate, however, is that such a link is not
inevitable—and therefore, that there is a burden on Knox to spell
out in more detail the connection between theoretical and operational
spacetime, if her account (on our preferred operationalist reading) is
to be compelling.
6 Baker’s proposal
When it comes to spacetime functionalism, Knox’s approach is not the
only game in town. One distinct but noteworthy spacetime functional-
ist approach is due to Baker [2]—not sharing Knox’s above-mentioned
operationalist leanings, Baker advances a very different functional con-
ception of spacetime. He begins [2, pp. 11-12] by noting that many
different factors seem to contribute to the spacetime concept:23
I won’t make any attempt to give an exhaustive list of
candidates here, but the following are examples of criteria
which are logically independent of Knox’s inertial criteria
22It is also interesting to note that making this move would compel one to identify
spacetime at the level of solutions, rather than theories.
23Citations in the following quotation have been modified for consistency with the
present chapter; there is no change in content.
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and which seem to also count toward a structure’s satisfy-
ing our spacetime concept:
• The structure is non-dynamical, at least with respect
to non-gravitational interactions.
• The structure is (in some sense) located everywhere in
all states of the theory.
• The structure does not carry energy or momentum.
• “Vacuum” solutions exist which describe the (puta-
tively) spatiotemporal structure in the absence of other
structures.
• There are no other structures in the theory which can
exist without the (putative) spacetime structure.
• The structure grounds or explains a family of modal
facts about which states are geometrically possible,
where geometric possibility does not reduce to physical
possibility [7, pp. 50-51].
• It is a (higher-order) law of nature that the geometric
symmetries of the structure are dynamical symmetries
of the theory [27, 57].
• Forces propagate across the spatial distances defined
by the metric characterizing the structure (so that
long-range forces like electromagnetism fall off propor-
tionately to the inverse square of this distance, and so
on).
• The structure is fundamental.
Again, this is not meant to be an exhaustive list. Rather
it is meant to illustrate that a vast number of different cri-
teria could plausibly figure into our ascription of the name
‘spacetime’ to a given theoretical structure, depending on
the details of the laws that define that structure. And in-
deed, Knox’s own criterion,
• The structure determines the difference between iner-
tial and non-inertial frames of reference,
belongs high on this list, perhaps even at the top. She
has certainly shown that it’s a very important criterion.
My only disagreement is with her claim that it is the sole
criterion.
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On the basis of these apparently myriad factors which contribute
to the spacetime concept, Baker draws the natural conclusion that,
ultimately, there is no unequivocal notion of spatiotemporality; rather,
spacetime is a cluster concept : [2, p. 2]
[O]ur spacetime concept has the structure of a cluster con-
cept. Rather than possessing a single set of necessary and
sufficient conditions, cluster concepts can be satisfied in a
variety of different ways by different entities falling under
them.
What to make of this proposal, especially as compared with Knox’s
own? On the one hand, Baker is likely correct that our pre-theoretic
concept of spacetime (insofar as we have such a pre-theoretic concept!)
cannot be analysed via one unequivocal set of necessary and sufficient
conditions. (This, of course, is part of a broader lesson against con-
ceptual analysis familiar from the latter half of the 20th century in
all branches of analytic philosophy.) On the other hand, in light of
its heterogeneity, Baker’s analysis lacks practical applicability. For ex-
ample, consider the cases presented in §4—on Baker’s cluster concept
approach to spacetime, which structure in each of these theories is to
be regarded as spatiotemporal? In light of the complexity of the anal-
ysis, it is difficult to give any definitive answer to this question. Thus,
while Baker is morally right on the nature of spacetime, his analysis
has limited practical value.
Such is not the case for Knox’s proposal: Knox gives a simple, func-
tional characterisation of spatiotemporality, which is readily applied
to new spacetime theories (consider, for example, the novel work to
which Knox puts her programme in [28, 30]). It might be the case
that Knox’s criterion does not fully capture our notion of spatiotem-
porality (including Knox’s own—this is, of course, the central point
of §§4-5 above); nevertheless, the claim is that this account of space-
time can deliver intuitively correct verdicts on spatiotemporality, and
so should feature as a (defeasible!) guide to spatiotemporality in new
cases also. While, as argued above, Knox should be more explicit
that inertial frame structure need not always constitute the sine qua
non of spatiotemporality (whether (i) because one has Knox’s oper-
ationalist leanings—in which case there is a gap between theoretical
and operational spacetime, or (ii) because one embraces Baker’s no-
tion of spacetime as a cluster concept), her approach has the capacity
to be put to novel interpretative work, in a manner in which Baker’s
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approach does not.
Thus, the final verdict on Knox’s inertial frame spacetime func-
tionalism versus Baker’s cluster concept spacetime functionalism is
the following: while Baker’s analysis is likely closer to our overall con-
ception of spatiotemporality, Knox’s analysis has the virtue of readily
applicability to new cases. Insofar as one takes inertial frame struc-
ture to be a guide to the other qualities which feature in the spacetime
concept (perhaps those on Baker’s list), one may continue to be jus-
tified in following Knox’s approach. Of course, however, one should
ideally make explicit the link between inertial frame structure, and
those other factors featuring in the spacetime concept.
7 Dynamical and geometrical approaches
It is sometimes claimed (see e.g. [32, 43]) that Knox’s inertial frame
spacetime functionalism “extends” previous work on the so-called dy-
namical approach to spacetime theories, first developed by Brown and
Pooley [10, 11, 12]. Roughly speaking, this ‘dynamical approach’ in-
volves two claims:24
1. Fixed fields (i.e., fields fixed identically in all kinematical possi-
bilities of a given theory—cf. [50, p. 115]), such as the Minkowski
metric field ηab of special relativity, are to be ontologically re-
duced to the symmetries of the dynamical equations governing
matter fields (the dynamical view is, therefore, a modern form
of relationalism—cf. [49, §6.3.2]).
2. Ontologically autonomous metric fields, such as gab in general
relativity, do not have their chronogeometic significance—i.e., are
not surveyed by physical measurement apparatuses—of necessity
(i.e., in all solutions of any theory in which they appear).25
Focussing on (2), advocates of one version of the opposing geomet-
rical approach to spacetime theories would state that ontologically
autonomous metric fields, such as gab in general relativity, do have
their chronogeometic significance necessarily. However, in [54, 55], it
was argued that this particular version of the geometrical approach
is not viable—precisely because there exist problem cases for such a
24The following explication of the dynamical approach is based upon two more-recent
publications on this view—viz., [14, 54].
25This latter point is what Butterfield calls in [16] ‘Brown’s moral.’
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view, in which one has a metric field gab in one’s theory, but that
structure is not surveyed by physical rods and clocks (some of the
examples presented in §4 of this paper would count as problem cases
of this kind for the geometrical view).26
In any case, regardless of the particular view which one espouses in
the dynamical/geometrical debate, one can ask: is it true that Knox’s
spacetime functionalism is an “extension” of the dynamical view? In
our view, this claim is not correct; rather, we see one’s having a partic-
ular set of commitments in this debate as being orthogonal to whether
one endorses Knox’s spacetime functionalism. Our reasons are the
following: whether one thinks that a given metric field is ontologi-
cally reducible to dynamical symmetries, or does or does not have its
chronogeometric significance necessarily, is distinct from the question
of whether one should regard this object as being spatiotemporal,
on Knox’s functional analysis of spacetime. Suppose, for example,
that one endorses the dynamical approach to spacetime theories—
then on Knox’s programme one will, in light of (2) above, deny that
e.g. a Lorentzian metric field gab always qualifies as spatiotemporal—
for whether this is so will depend upon particular facts about the
matter sector of the theory under consideration. On the other hand,
if one denies (2) (a` la the strong version of the geometrical approach
above), then one will think that a generic Lorentizan metric field gab
always qualifies as spatiotemporal. Not only are both of these dynami-
cal and geometrical views perfectly compatible with Knox’s spacetime
functionalism, but, moreover, they would also be compatible with a
different functional conception of spacetime—or, indeed, with certain
non-functional approaches to spacetime.
Though the above is, essentially, our final take on this matter,
two further remarks are in order in this vicinity. First, one way to
understand the geometrical approach in contrast with the dynamical
approach is that the former is willing to make certain ‘riskier’ as-
sumptions about the chronogeometric status of a given field (e.g. gab)
than the dynamical approach is willing to countenance. We have seen
in §5 above, however, that an underlying assumption of Knox’s ap-
proach is that theoretical spacetime is a good guide to operational
26While in this paper we do assume that this particular version of the geometrical
approach is untenable, we are otherwise agnostic on the dynamical/geometrical debate.
Indeed, in [54], it was argued that there exist other, perfectly viable versions of the geo-
metrical approach—roughly speaking, these versions of the geometrical approach accept
(2), but continue to reject (1).
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spacetime. In this sense, Knox too is (arguably) making an a pri-
ori assumption about the nature of certain fields which appear in our
physical theories. In this very particular sense, one might argue that
such assumptions place Knox closer to the geometrical rather than
the dynamical view. This should be surprising, since, as noted above,
several authors tie Knox’s spacetime functionalism more closely to the
dynamical approach, than to the geometrical approach.
A final word on the dynamical approach, in light of the distinc-
tions which have been drawn in this paper. As mentioned above, in
the context of theories with fixed metric structure, such as special rela-
tivity, advocates of the dynamical approach state that such structure
just is a codification of the symmetries of the dynamical equations
governing matter fields in the theory; in this way, they seek to re-
duce metric structure to dynamical symmetries (for more on this, see
[14, 43]). For example, if the dynamical equations governing matter
fields are invariant under Poincare´ transformations, then one just has
a Minkowski metric in one’s theory. In [58], it is argued that the
dynamical approach should, therefore, be understood as a means of
identifying spacetime structure with what Einstein dubbed in 1921
practical geometry [19]—that is, that geometrical structure which is
actually surveyed by physical measurement apparatuses. In light of
our distinction between theoretical and operational spacetime, how-
ever, we can see that this claim is in general too fast—while it might be
true for theories such as special relativity, it is not in general correct to
state that what we have called in this paper ‘operational spacetime’—
Einstein’s ‘practical geometry’—is the same as that structure which
codifies the symmetries of the dynamical equations governing mat-
ter fields. A certain degree of caution is, therefore, apposite when
approaching such claims.
8 Conclusions
The central aim of this paper has been to identify and diagnose prob-
lems for inertial frame spacetime functionalism. The diagnosis made
it clear that more needs to be done than Knox might have initially
anticipated in identifying the chronogeometric structure of dynami-
cal fields—Knox’s shortcut from universal symmetries to generic field
behaviour is not universally valid.
While Baker’s approach might preferable to that of Knox vis-a`-vis
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identification of all aspects of the spacetime concept, from the point
of view of practical utility and applicability, Knox’s approach is to
be preferred. If one shares Knox’s operationalist point of view, then
one faces an urgent burden to bridge the gap between theoretical and
operational spacetime. In our view, this is not indicative of the failure
of Knox’s approach—but rather simply that there remains much more
work to be done in fully elaborating this position.
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